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THE RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN EXAMPLES TO
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
JOHN BELL*
INTRODUCTION
The use of foreign legal sources in legal argument is commonplace.
It is an integral part of the way lawyers work. The use of such arguments in
American constitutional law may be controversial, but it is widely practiced
in other branches of the law, even by those who complain about the use
made of foreign sources in constitutional law.1 But it is possible to
overstate the importance of the argument from “elsewhere,” as Martin
Loughlin described it.2 This Article seeks to make sense of the argument
from foreign sources drawing principally on work undertaken for the
European Legal Development project which I headed with David Ibbetson.
In the light of that project, it is possible to engage with the justifications
offered by leading authors Markesinis and Waldron for the use of foreign
law. This Article argues that a justification based on foreign sources is not
essentially a free-standing justification, but rather gives additional luster to
arguments that can be based on existing domestic law sources by showing
that they illustrate a principle or value shared by a number of other legal
systems.
By contrast, Markesinis presents the major pragmatic argument that
foreign law offers a distinct justification for a legal result in that foreign
law contains useful lessons for domestic law.3 He argues that this can be
achieved if academic lawyers package the foreign law in ways that make it
accessible to the practitioners (judges and counsel in cases). Waldron4
* Professor of Law (1973), University of Cambridge, U.K. This is the revised version of my
Berstein Lecture given at the Duke University School of Law in February 2010.
1. Jusice Scalia is perhaps the most prominent example. See e.g.,Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 598 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also BASIL MARKESINIS WITH JÖRG FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW 195-203
(2d ed. 2009).
2. Martin Loughlin, The Importance of Elsewhere, 4 PUB. L. REV. 44, 56-7 (1993).
3. See generally Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11
(2005).
4. Jeremy Waldron, Treating Like Cases Alike in the World: The Theoretical Basis of the
Demand for Legal Unity, in HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALISATION 99, 109 (Sam Muller & Sidney
Richards eds., 2010) [hereinafter HIGHEST COURTS].
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offers a more principled justification. He suggests that we need to examine
foreign law essentially out of concerns for equality before the law.
In discussing this topic, we need to distinguish the process of
discovery (how we should go about making a decision) and the process of
justification (why anyone should accept our decision as correct in law).5
The mere fact that we examine foreign legal arguments as part of the
process of discovering what the law is does not mean that these arguments
provide a justification for a decision by a judge. Markesinis’s utility
argument predominantly addresses the process of discovery, whereas
Waldron’s argument is more closely directed at the process of justification.
This Article focuses its attention on the place of foreign law as a
justification for a domestic decision.
My argument will be developed in two phases. First, I will present
examples of the place of foreign law in the development of private law in
Europe. In the second Part, I will relate the conclusions to the arguments of
Waldron on why one should take account of foreign law in domestic legal
decisions.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
In what situations does the problem arise of citing foreign legal
arguments as a justification for a legal decision? There are three situations
in which a foreign legal principle may feature in the justifications that a
national lawyer gives for a decision. They can be illustrated as follows:
(a) A national court applying an international treaty may justify its
decision by citing the decision of another national court of a state party
to that treaty. For instance, a Danish decision interpreting the Geneva
Convention on refugees would provide a reason in its own right that
the Convention has a particular meaning for a country like the UK,
which is also a signatory. The Danish decision’s argumentative weight
comes essentially from the Convention, but it is a concretization of it.
A domestic lawyer really has no problem with this situation. The
national legal order either incorporates the Convention or has an
interpretative obligation to make the national law compatible as far as
possible with treaty law. So it is appropriate to examine foreign
decisions on a provision that is shared by both systems.
(b) Within the common law, courts of one jurisdiction are used to
citing decisions of other common law courts that apply the same
principles. For instance, an Australian decision on tort law offers both
an example of how to interpret the common law and in particular a

5. See NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 208 (2005).
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principle within the common law. An example is causation, on which
an English common law decision could be based. So it is not that the
Australian decision as such has any weight, but it illustrates a principle
of the (shared) common law within a particular area from which an
English rule could also be drawn. This is why common lawyers are
some of the most regular users of comparative law, even if that
comparison is within the common law family. European Union (“EU”)
law does use the concept of “principles common to the constitutional
traditions of Member States” and this, under article 308 of the
European Community Treaty, serves as a basis for the creation of
European Community law. But this concept suggests that there might
be some principles of law that are shared between states. In my
Australian example, the common law6 is a binding source of law, and
so the appeal to a principle within that common law that is shared by a
number of legal systems is an appeal in some sense to a binding source
of law. In the EU example, the source is binding on the EU, but only
on Member States when they are acting as EU courts.
(c) The more interesting and difficult question is whether a legal rule
of another jurisdiction can provide a justification where there is no
express common rule that is shared with the receiving jurisdiction. An
argument from France might be a curiosity in England—for example,
on wrongful birth—but it does not formally add any weight to a
solution reached by the application of English law. It may comfort the
English judge that judges from other countries have reached the same
solution, but does this help with the justification? It may clearly serve
as a source of inspiration, but in what way does it provide a distinctive
argument?

It is the third category of case that contains the interest for this
Article. In the difficult cases, where a judge draws on the practice of
another legal system to support a decision in his own, he is immediately
met with the argument that the foreign law is not one of the sources of his
own domestic legal system. It is, therefore, formally irrelevant. This Article
discusses how he might make the foreign system relevant.

6. We can argue whether the common law binds through a notion of established caselaw or of
general principles of law. See generally Robert Alexy et al., Precedent in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 17, 30 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1997) (describing observance of German precedent as obligatory); see generally Michel Troper &
Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 103, 130 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (describing French precedents as not being binding
themselves but rather as being illustrative of formally binding legal principles). Civilian courts often
cite decisions of other jurisdictions for their persuasive power, which is close to the idea of a “common
law” extending beyond specific national boundaries.
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II. PRIVATE LAW AS A CONVERSATION BEYOND BOUNDARIES
Private law offers a rich history of examples of one jurisdiction
drawing on the law of another jurisdiction in developing its law. The
European Legal Development project has examined the development of the
law of tort in Europe from 1850 to 2000, in particular, liability for fault.7
The argument in this Part is that, at least in private law, there is a regular
conversation across national boundaries. Often, we examine the meaning of
texts that may cross nations. But even where we are not examining a
common text, the existence of common problems or tasks makes it not
merely prudent or useful to find out what other countries do. Their
experience is often a trigger for legal change. It is rare that we import the
foreign solution, but we often revise our law in light of the results that
foreign systems have been able to achieve. In another place, I have called
this “cross-fertilization.”8 Essentially this means the change that occurs in a
legal system integrates with the patterns of that system, so it looks like it
belongs. In more formal terms, we maintain the importance of coherence as
well as consistency within the legal system.9
There is a danger that we think of legal systems as closed, limited by
obedience to one political sovereign with a single set of legal professions
and courts, with a united education and training system. This picture does
not capture the interplay between legal systems. The institutional structure
and influences between systems are much more complex and varied,
leading to regular links. In the first section, I show that, at least within
Europe, there are background conditions that make legal systems
necessarily open to influences from other national legal systems. In the

7. The series includes seven volumes: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW OF TORTS (David Ibbetson & John Bell eds. 2010);THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
(Simon Whittaker ed., 2010) [hereinafter PRODUCT LIABILITY]; THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRAFFIC
LIABILITY (Wolfgang Ernst ed., 2010) [hereinafter TRAFFIC LIABILITY]; THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MEDICAL LIABILITY (Ewoud Hondius ed., 2010); THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BETWEEN
NEIGHBORS (James Gordley ed., 2010); THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY IN RELATION TO
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2010) hereinafter TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE];
THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAKING OF LEGAL DOCTRINE (Nils Jansen ed., 2010) [hereinafter LEGAL
DOCTRINE].
8. John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 147 (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas eds., 1998) (defining
“cross-fertilisation” as “an external stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system.
The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in its own way. The new
development is a distinctive but organic product of that system rather than a bolt-on.”).
9. MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 190, 193 (arguing that consistency is simply a matter of the
lack of contradiction between legal provisions, but coherence “is a matter of their ‘making sense’ by
being rationally related as a set, instrumentally or intrinsically, to the realization of some common value
or values”).
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second section and drawing on the European Legal Development project, I
show an example of how legal ideas from the United States in relation to
product liability shaped the development of civilian legal systems in
Europe.
A. Background Conditions
There are three background features of legal systems which may
explain why they are porous to ideas from other legal systems. First, there
is no necessary reason to conceive of legal systems existing in isolation
from each other. This is connected to the nature of the law. Private law is
essentially about texts, rather than about the intention of the legislature. The
reasons for this are obvious. In Europe, the boundaries of nation states have
been fluid. Take the town of Tournai in Belgium. In 1787, it was part of the
Austrian Empire and an Austrian version of Roman Law prevailed in
private law. In 1795, it was part of the French Republic, and so it adopted
the French Civil Code when it was enacted in 1804. In 1814, it was part of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which also had the French Civil Code. In
1830, it was part of the new Kingdom of Belgium. In 1914 and again in
1940, it was occupied by Germany without the abolition of its Civil Code.
Belgium has the French Civil Code of 1804 because of the occupation by
the French, but since 1949 the Code has existed in two languages, French
and the Flemish (Dutch) language. Since 1951, it has operated within the
various forms of what is now the European Union. Belgian lawyers
recognise the difficulty of looking just at the rules enacted by the Belgian
legislator and the decisions of the Belgian courts.10 Countries like Germany
and Italy did not exist as nation states before 1870. Their law schools have
existed for many centuries and have interpreted private law, but the
attachment to a nation state has not been crucial.
Second and consequently, attachment to a document is more
important, and that document is interpreted. So the French civil code of
1804 applied in France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, parts of Italy and
part of Germany at various times in the nineteenth century.11 Commentaries
on that Code circulated widely. So the German-language commentary by
Zacharias was used in southern Germany and its structure (and some of its

10. See BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT & MARK VAN HOECKE, INLEIDING TOT HET RECHT 19 (10th ed.
1994).
11. See RICHTERLICHE ANWENDUNG DES CODE CIVIL IN SEINEN EUROPÄISCHEN
GELTUNGSBEREICH AUSSERHALB FRANKREICHES (Barbara Dölemeyer, Heinz Mohnhaupt &
Alessandro Somma eds., 2006).
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ideas) were used by French writers when they wrote their own textbooks.12
Belgian and Luxembourgeois interpretations of the same civil code were
then cited in French courts. Common texts create the community and the
tradition of interpretation.13 The result is that commentaries produced in
one country are being read in others.14 A particular feature of this
conversation between legal systems over the same texts is the importance
of translations and thus the accessibility of these ideas.15 The existence of
translations shows a ready market for foreign ideas, which is not confined
to countries sharing the same legal tradition.
This history of European territories and the conversation about the
interpretation of texts have an important impact on how the law is
conceived. It is first and foremost a tradition within which particular texts
have pride of place. They are then interpreted and re-interpreted over time.
Only secondarily is the law the will of the enacting legislator.16 After all,
the law of any state is made up of provisions enacted by a wide variety of
legislators—monarchs, dictators, democracies and lots of others in
between. If you look at the references in private law textbooks, you get no
hint that a law enacted by the Nazis or a decision of the courts under Nazi
rule might not be still good private law. That is why I have argued like so
many Europeans that we take a contemporaneous view of the interpretation
of the law, rather than a historical one.17
Take for example a current commentary on the German Civil Code
(legislation of 1896, coming into force in 1900, which was during the
Empire):
[Der Gläubiger] haftet also für den vom Eigentümer erlittenen
Rechtsverlust, sofern ihn an der Pfändung und Verwertung einer
schuldnerfremden Sachen ein Verschulden trifft.

12. See CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS D’APRÈS LA
MÉTHODE DE ZACHARIAE (4th ed. 1869).
13. On the notion of tradition, see generally Mark Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237,
237-62 (1986).
14. See GUIDO ALPA, TRADITION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN ITALIAN LAW 34-51 (2005). See also
David Ibbetson, English Law and the European Ius Commune 1450-1650, 1 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (2006) (relating to the earlier period).
15. See GUIDO ALPA, THE AGE OF REBUILDING 375-76 (2007) (noting that over 1000 legal works
were translated from French into Italian in the nineteenth century, with about half that number
translated from German and about 160 English works).
16. Cf. JOHN BELL & GEORGE ENGLE, CROSS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 23-30 (3d ed. 1995).
17. John Bell, Interpreting Statutes over Time, in TEMPS ET DROIT, LE DROIT A-T-IL POUR
VOCATION DE DURER? 31-53 (François Ost & Mark Van Hoecke eds., 1998).
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[The debtor is therefore liable for the deterioration in rights suffered by
the owner of property, insofar as that wrongfully affects the pledging
and the value of things external to the creditor].

Set side by side in the footnotes, we have cases from all kinds of
regimes being cited as evidence of what the current law is.18 These
references are to German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht/Bundesgerichtshof
(“BGB”)) decisions from all the regimes since 1900, including Nazi
Germany. The law is a set of texts that have to be interpreted. (In that
respect, it is rather like Scripture, as Gadamer points out.19) German
lawyers interpret those texts in the light of the current constitution,
membership of the European Union and the values expressed in
contemporary principles of private law.20
The common law is a similar system. English lawyers cheerfully cite
Australian, Canadian, Irish and New York cases to support an argument
about the law of tort. It does not bother us whether there have been
constitutional differences or whether the rules were created at different
periods. Our concern is to find the principles that now represent the
common law.
Third, the movement of ideas is not limited to national boundaries
because academics (and judges) are intellectual scavengers. Individuals are
mobile and visit or communicate with colleagues abroad. National law is a
latecomer to the Academy. In France, it dates from 1689 (and not really
until 1807). In England, the first course was in 1753 and the real start of
teaching English law in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge is after
1871.21 In Germany, Thomasius was giving lectures on German law in the
University of Halle in 1705 and Beyer in Wittenberg in 1707,22 but it was
much more legal history than the science of contemporary law. Creating
local German civil laws was a work started in the mid-eighteenth century,23
but it took a while. Legal education revolved in Germany and England for

18. Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 61, 430, 432 (1905, during the
German Empire); RGZ 108 (260, 263) (1924, during the Weimar Republic); RGZ 156 (395,400) (1938,
during Hitler’s Third Reich); Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 58 (207,
210) (1972, German Federal Republic (West Germany)); [BGHZ] 118 (201, 205ff) (1992, German
Federal Republic (Unified Germany): Taken from Gerhard Wagner, in 5 MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH §823at 1788, para. 108 n.430 (5th ed., Mathias Habersack ed. 2009).
19. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 294-95 (1975).
20. See, e.g., BASIL S. MARKESINSIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS, 415–
420 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the Herrenreiter decision).
21. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS 61–63 (1987).
22. See RICHARD SCHRÖDER, LEHRBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN RECHSTGESCHICHTE 904 (4th ed.
1902).
23. Id. at 910–12.
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many years around Roman law. So there was no need to restrict interest to
what emanated from national courts or legislatures. Equally, there was no
necessary restriction on individuals and where they worked. John Austin,
the first professor of jurisprudence in the University of London found that
few people were coming to his lectures, so he went off to Heidelberg for
much of the rest of his life.24 Leading works of the period display an
erudite knowledge of the laws of other European systems. Dicey was proud
to write about the strengths of the British constitution. But that did not
prevent him from citing Gneist, Duguit, de Toqueville and Montesquieu, as
well as discussing the Swiss and US constitutions.25 Simpson points out
that the French civil code was cited more than 40 times in English cases up
to 1850. In tort, we have a great awareness of solutions in different
countries. The most obvious examples are Pollock and Winfield; Pollock’s
view of the law of torts was shaped greatly by his stay in Harvard.26
Winfield looked to U.S. caselaw in the 1920s, confirmed by visits he made.
These visits led to articles in English and American journals that paved the
way for the leading decision of Donoghue v. Stevenson in 1932.27
B. Illustration of Legal Developments: Products
I want to take two stories from the book on product liability in the
European Legal Development series.28 Our two correspondents, Coggiola
and Wagner, give us accounts of the place of two individuals in the
development of product liability in Italy and Germany. The problem is how
the end-user of a product could claim compensation for personal injuries
suffered as a result of defects in the product.
The research for our project relating to products shows how legal
ideas travel. With the move from an agricultural economy to an industrial
economy, two changes occur. The first is that products become more
complex, so caveat emptor is less appropriate: the buyer is really not in a
position to assess a product by visual inspection. The second is that the
distribution chain changes. Instead of the buyer relying on a local seller and
his expertise, the manufacturer produces standardised products and markets

24. See WILLIAM L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982).
25. See ALBERT V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONSTITUTION 183–205 (10th ed.
1959) (1915).
26. See e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION 224–
48 (2004); LEGAL DOCTRINE, supra note 7, at 49 n. 21; Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence,
34 COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1934).
27. See Alan Rodger, Lord Macmillan's Speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 108 L. Q. REV. 236
(1993).
28. See generally PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7.
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them directly to the public. There is little distinctive contribution from the
retailer-distributor. The legal options are either that the victim sues for a
breach of warranty in the sales contract or brings a tort/delict action.
The sorts of complex products being bought in the second half of the
nineteeth century were generally industrial machinery, the victims of which
were typically employees. Workmens’ Compensation, introduced in
Germany in 1884 and spreading across Europe by 1910, provided a nontortious solution for injuries caused by machines.29 The next complex
product was the motor car. This product was bought initially by rich
consumers and later by the wider public. Accidents were frequent. In
Germany in 1909, there was one accident causing death or personal injury
for every seven vehicles on the road.30 In France in 1925, the Cour de
cassation reacted by creating strict liability in contract on the part of a
professional seller who was liable for all losses if the product had a hidden
defect.31 Coupled with lax rules of privity, this provided a basis of liability
for consumers, even if they were not the purchaser of products. Particularly
because of the influence of an article written by a Parisian professor,
Mazeaud, in 1955,32 the fiction developed that the professional seller was
deemed to be in bad faith. There was a short time limit within which a
claim for breach of warranty could be brought under article 1641 of the
French Civil Code. A more contested solution was to use strict liability for
things. Having found its own solution, France became rather immune from
later developments. There were problems with Ford cars manufactured in
Germany in the 1930s owing to defects in the brakes which Ford knew
about. In 1940, the German Supreme Court held Ford liable for intentional
delict under §826 BGB.33 In the 1920s, English lawyers retained fault
liability for defective brakes, rather than the tort of breach of a statutory
duty.34 After World War II and the subsequent austerity period ended, the
consumer society was reborn with a much greater variety of manufactured
products.35

29. French law had adapted its private law and administrative law liability rules to create a form of
strict liability in 1895-96, shortly before workmen’s compensation was introduced. In English law, the
tort of breach of a statutory duty performed a similar role. See Groves v. Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 Q.B.
402 (Eng.).
30. See TRAFFIC LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 93 n.66.
31. Cour de cassation [Cass.] req. 21, Oct. 20, 1925, D.P. 1925, 1.9, obs. Célice, (France).
32. See PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 91.
33. Id.at 120: RGZ 163 (21, 25) (Ger.); RG Deutsches Recht 1940, 1293 (Ger.).
34. TRAFFIC LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 40–41; Phillips v. British Hygienic Laundry [1923] 2
K.B. at 832 (Eng.).
35. See PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 46.
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In the early part of the twentieth century, Italian courts were very
protective of newly emerging industries. Italian scholars were naturally
outward-looking. There had been an official attempt to have a new joint
Civil Code with the French in 1928. Subsequently, an official Italian
commission produced a modern civil code, which was later enacted in 1942
and is still in force.36 That was heavily influenced by German
developments including their civil code of 1900. In such a context, it was
not surprising that leading Italian scholars, such as Gorla in 1937, studying
at product liability should look at French solutions as a model. In France,
the modern solution was to use strict contractual liability on the part of the
professional seller under the warranty against hidden defects. Such a
liability could apply not only to the purchaser, but also to the ultimate user,
mainly by some ingenious re-interpretation of the rules on privity of
contract. Gorla represented this tendency in 1937 and showed how it could
apply in Italian law.37 The problem remained firmly labelled as a problem
of “sales,” not a problem of product liability. He developed his argument
after World War II, as French doctrinal writing and caselaw expanded.38
But, while French law was a natural reference point, it had to be
acknowledged that French law was out of line with the tradition of Roman
law in which Italian law stood and was stretching the Code by ingenious
fictions—treating all professional sellers in bad faith and interpreting “costs
incurred in the sale” as including any kind of loss. There was also the
problem of stretching privity of contract. It is here that Gorla’s newly
discovered reference point, the United States, came in. He was in the
United States in 1949-50, just as Justice Traynor’s early decisions on
products were being discussed.39 To begin with, he started to borrow the
American conceptualization of the problem, using a social category,
“product liability,” rather than a legal category, “sales.” In addition, from
the American experience, he saw an alternative legal route to compensation
for the victim of defective products to the law on sales. It was also clear
that Gorla had read the work of Prosser, which was to lead to the Second

36. GUIDO ALPA, LA CULTURA DELLE, 260 and 304ff (2000).
37. See Nadia Coggiola, The Development of Product Liability in Italy, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 28, 197–98 (citing GINO GORLA, LA COMPRAVENDITA, nos 121, 170
(1937) (suggesting that the discussion on the issue is actually extremely brief, as it was of marginal
interest in the overall scheme of his work).
38. Id. at 213–14 (citing articles by Gino Gorla from 1957 and 1959).
39. In particular, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal 2d 453 (1944); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1132 (1960) (collecting cases); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 197–207 (Expanded ed. 2003).
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restatement text of §402A published in 1965.40 The idea of strict liability
through reversing the burden of proof in fault liability actions under art.
2043 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942 offered an alternative.41 That came
through in a decision in 1964, Saiwa.42 The case concerned personal injury
caused to consumers through defective biscuits. The Italian Supreme Court
(Corte di cassazione) rejected the argument of the manufacturer that the
consumer had to prove it had been at fault. It is clear from Martorano’s
commentary on the case43 that discussions in Germany and the United
States were well known, especially through the work of Gino Gorla in
195944 and Werner Lorenz’s seminal article in 1961.45 There is also
discussion of insurance being taken out by manufacturers to deal with this
liability.46 So the foreign material provides a context, especially for
academic writers, but would clearly have been known to the Court.47 The
importance of American law was to take on board both problem-based
classification and a greater emphasis on the role of law in social
engineering. The specific solution to which a transplant of Prosser’s ideas
would have led was strict liability. That was not doctrinally possible in
Italy, despite the urgings of many authors, like Gorla.48 Instead the Court in
Saiwa49 adopted a presumption of liability, which the manufacturer found it
hard to discharge.
In our collection, Wagner makes similar points about Germany. There
is one pivotal author for the development of product liability, Werner

40. See WHITE, supra note 39, at 169–72. WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (1955).
41. See Coggiola, supra note 37, at 209.
42. Cass., sez III, 25 May 1964, n.1270, reprinted in 88 FORO ITALIANO: RACCOLTA GENERALE
DI GIURISPRUDENZA, at 2098 (1965), commented on by Frederico Martorano, Sulla responsabilità del
fabbricante per la messa in commercio di prodotti dannosi (a proposito di una sentenza della
Cassazione) in 89 FORO ITALIANO: RACCOLTA GENERALE DI GIURISPRUDENZA 13 (1966).
43. Martorano, supra note 42, at 15-17.
44. Gino Gorla, Considerazioni sulla giurisprudenza francese in tema di garanzia per i vizi
redibitori, in STUDI IN ONORE DI FRANCESCO MESSINEO 231 (A. Scialoja ed., 1959).
DER
RECHTSUND
45. Werner
Lorenz,
Produkthaftung,
in
FESTSCHRIFT
STAATSWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN FAKULTÄT DER JULIUS-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT WŰRZBURG ZUM
75. GEBURTSTAG VON HERMANN NOTTARP , 591 (P. Mikat ed., 1961).
46. Martorano, supra note 42, at 16 n.16 (citing M. De Martino, Prospettive nuove di una formula
di copertura in evoluzione: l’assicurazione della responsabilità civile prodotti, in 61 DIRITTO E
PRATICA DI ASSICURAZIONE (1964)).
47. See id. at 16.
48. See Coggiola, supra note 37, at 213-15.
49. Cass., sez III, 25 May 1964, n. 1270, reprinted in 88 FORO ITALIANO: RACCOLTA GENERALE
DI GIURISPRUDENZA, at 2098 (1965).
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Lorenz. He won a scholarship to spend time in England and was familiar
with the works of Prosser and Gorla. Wagner writes50
With a little exaggeration, one might say that product liability was
imported from the US, both with regard to the legal problem and its
solution. The question as to why American law figured so prominently
here is difficult to answer. One factor might have been the emigration
of eminent German lawyers—mostly of Jewish faith—to the US,
which made it easier for German [language scholars] to access the
learning of American law. Throughout the 1960s, a relatively high
number of German-born professors continued to teach at leading
American law schools, and they were happy to introduce scholars from
post-war Germany to American legal thought. In addition, the German
and the US governments facilitated scholarly exchange across the
Atlantic, both financially and politically, in order to help re-educate
German lawyers.

Like Herbert Bernstein at Duke, Rudolf Schlesinger of Cornell was
such a German-born professor teaching at an American law school.51 He
invited Gorla and Lorenz to work on projects with him. Lorenz’s ideas
formed part of an active debate on whether contract or delict (torts) should
be the basis of liability. This was resolved by the BGH in its “Fowlpest” or
“Newcastle Disease” decision of 1968.52 Lorenz’s views that one should
create a direct liability based on reliance were not accepted. They were too
far from existing legal techniques.53 But the court did come to a similar
result by creating a presumption of fault based on the damage occurring
within the sphere of control of the manufacturer.54 The manufacturer found
it in practice difficult to discharge the burden of proof imposed. Lorenz
then went to be an expert for the Council of Europe project on product
liability, which gave rise to the Directive.55
50. Gerhard Wagner, The Development of Product Liability in Germany, in PRODUCT LIABILITY,
supra note 7, at 121.
51. For information on the importance of émigré scholars for comparative law generally, see Jack
Beatson, Aliens, Enemy Aliens, and Friendly Enemy Aliens: Britain as a Home for Émigré Lawyers, in
JURISTS UPROOTED, 73, 87 (Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004) (stating that 132 of the
1200 university teachers dismissed by the Nazi Government in 1933 were law teachers, and that there
were 113 refugee lawyers and 102 law students registered in Britain in 1933).
52. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 26, 1968, 51 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 91 (93ff) (Ger.), translated in CASES, MATERIALS AND
TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 601 (Walter van Gerven et al.
eds., 2000) [hereinafter SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW].
53. See SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW, supra note 52, at 99.
54. Id. at 93-101.
55. Council Directive 1985/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. OJ L
210, 7 August 1985. Council of Europe, Council Directive, On the Approximation of the Laws,
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These two stories illustrate three points: (1) legal development
depends on people, as much as on ideas; (2) legal development frequently
does not involve borrowing something from another legal system, but being
inspired to create an indigenous rule or principle (i.e. development results
from cross-fertilisation); and (3) the extent of foreign influence depends on
how it is presented and the climate of the receiving legal community.
(1)These two stories merely illustrate that the circulation of ideas
depends on people. Legal development is not often the result of systematic
activity. People with their own personal histories and reasons for travel or
communication become vectors for the transmission of legal ideas. This is
particularly the case where you need to translate the ideas into another
language or into another legal culture. But the two stories show that
individual histories relate to a broader climate in their legal community and
in their society. The choice of potential comparisons (France or the United
States) fit what others in their community saw as relevant and exciting.
Their compatriots were ready to listen to what they brought back from
those countries. In the case of liability for products, there was also a sense
that the United States (and to some extent France) represented societies that
were more advanced economically and from which lessons could be
learned.
(2) But, of course, the mere publication or transmission of information
about other legal systems does not lead inevitably to any legal change. In
order to achieve change, there need to be decisions, often strategic
decisions, by those in power (courts or legislators). The circulation of ideas
by academics merely provides the basic material from which decisions can
be selected. Neither Gorla’s views, influenced by French law and by
American law, nor Lorenz’s theory of strict liability, influenced by
American law, were accepted by their national courts. But this did not
mean that they were unsuccessful. The extent of the discussion in the BGH
shows that these were views that had to be taken seriously and could not be
dismissed as some exotic foreign invention of no relevance to Germany.
Just before the BGH decision in the Fowlpest case, the German annual
conference of law scholars (the Juristentag) had been given over to the
question of product liability.56 So Lorenz’s contribution was shaping a
much larger debate. The same is true of Gorla’s contribution, which
sparked a range of contributions noted in the commentary on the Saiwa
case.57 Perhaps the most important part of the contribution is not the
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, 1985/374/EEC (Jul. 25, 1985).
56. Wagner, supra note 50, at 122 n.20.
57. See Martorano, supra note 42.
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particular opinion that each academic author proposed, but the way in
which each contributed significantly to changing the frame of reference for
academic and judicial debate. In particular, they managed to make
American common law a legitimate point of reference for legal
interpretation within civil law systems.
(3) The effectiveness of this approach depended on how the American
system was presented. Guido Alpa makes the point that, in the nineteenth
century, there were many translations of works on English law by leading
writers.58 But this did not lead to any influence from the common law on
Italian private law. The reason he suggests is that those English authors
who were translated generally criticized English law as archaic and
unsystematic. If national lawyers were not enthusiastic about the merits of
their own system, why should foreign lawyers take it seriously?59 This was
in contrast to the enthusiasm expressed by many of the same authors for the
British constitution, and that enthusiasm was influential. American authors
such as Prosser were enthusiastic about the development of product
liability and this was infectious. The second aspect is the way the ideas are
received. Here the arguments of the American lawyers engaged with the
period mood in European countries. Economic progress after the dark days
of war was highlighted in the consumer revolution. America had been
further ahead in the 1930s and was very much ahead in the 1950s. Product
liability fit into emerging social and economic changes arising from
changes in the modes of production and distribution of goods. Alpa notes
that it is not surprising that “consumerism” as a legal idea starts in America
and then spread to Italy, among other European countries.60Although there
was some recognition of the category of “consumer” in the preparatory
documents for the Italian Civil Code in 1941, significant legal discussion of
consumer rights took place in the 1970s, following on from the consumer
boom in the Italian economy of the 1960s.61 The law on product liability
was characterised as modernizing German or Italian or European law to
deal with a new problem. The paradigm of modernization fit the Zeitgeist.
The alternative paradigm was the paradigm of fidelity to tradition, to
doctrinal consistency. Although the courts actually negotiated changes
between these two paradigms, the significance of what Gorla and Lorenz
achieved was really to push the legal debate into a new dominant paradigm
in this area.
58. See Alpa, supra note 15, at 376.
59. Id. at 380-81. But cf. id. at 392-93 (describing Gorla’s willingness to embrace Pollock’s
justification for the bindingness of contract in consideration).
60. Id. at 201-02.
61. Id. at 200, 202-3, 203 n.9.
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So, in terms of content, the influence of the United States encouraged
the creation of the liability of manufacturers for products. But the Italians
did not parallel the American method of strict liability in tort but they
reconsidered their own law to find analogous routes by a presumption of
liability under artice 2043 of the Italian Civil Code.
C. Comparative Law and the Legislator
Legislation is often adopted not necessarily in order to deal with a
pressing domestic social problem, but as much for symbolic reasons. The
national legislation can appear modern. In Spain, industrialization had
come late, and only a very small proportion of the workforce was engaged
in industry. Workmen’s compensation was not the pressing social problem
that it was elsewhere. But the Spanish legislature regarded workmen’s
compensation legislation as a badge of modernity and forward thinking; it
did not matter that only a very small number of people could benefit from
it.62
Legal change is the product of many factors. But an important part of
the process of reviewing the law usually involves an examination of what
other countries are doing. A first reason may be the comparison of different
experiences and outcomes: a way of checking whether systems that have
broadly similar problems are achieving similar kinds of outcome. The
second use might be to look for advanced systems and put the law in an
advanced position. The third reason might be to anticipate the future.
In the United Kingdom, the national law commissions will typically
undertake research on how the law is being developed in other countries
(for example, privity of contract). In relation to product liability, the subject
formed part of a wide-ranging Royal Commission on Civil Liability,63
which did look at foreign jurisdictions. The principle of selection is
obviously relevance: so common law countries tend to be preferred, though
civil law systems are also the object of study. The legislator will choose not
only on the basis of systemic compatibility, but also on the reputation of
another system for being progressive. European-wide legislation is
preferred because it ensures that there are no competitive disadvantages.
This was certainly the case in Italy.
The legislature will undertake a certain amount of horizon scanning.
Within Europe, no country was big enough to have a complete picture of
62. See Miquel Martín-Casals & Jordi Ribot, Technological Change and the Development of
Liability for Fault in Spain, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 7, at 227, 238-244.
63. See generally Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury,
1977-78, Cmnd. 7054; see Peter Bartrip, No-Fault Compensation on the Roads in Twentieth Century
Britain, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 263, 274-81 (2010).
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the problems and solutions. It is here that the more advanced countries play
a significant role. In order to predict problems, it is easier to examine the
experience of other systems. A classic example was Prussia in 1838. It
introduced legislation on compensation for railway accidents merely four
days after the first passenger line was opened. The Prussian King had seen
the accidents in England64 and wanted to ensure that provision was made.
In relation to products, Spain developed rules in the light of German and
American experiences.
But we noted in the project that comparative law examples provide the
raw material for legislative reform. The actual trigger for legislative action
is likely to be a crisis. This is most clearly seen in relation to Spain, where
specific legislation was enacted immediately following the Colza oil
scandal.65 In May 1981 a mass poisoning resulted from the consumption of
denaturalized colza oil. This process was required by Spanish law in order
to prevent certain imported oils from reaching the consumer market. When
the product reached the consumers, thousands of people were affected. The
scandal led to legislation protecting consumers in 1984 and to judicial
decisions in 1990.66 Whittaker comments: “one is left with the impression
of a set of legislative provisions put together under political pressure in too
much haste, and without full thought being given to their technical or
practical implications.”67 The Thalidomide case was another example
where legislative investigation was triggered by an accident.68 In such
situations, the legislator draws on what is already available by way of
preparation, because the imperative to legislate in response to public
opinion often outstrips the capacity for rational deliberation.
Of course, in addition, national governments form part of a wider
community of ideas. The development of product liability in Europe shows
this. In his introduction to The Development of Product Liability, Whittaker
explains that the basic ideas of current product liability were developed by
the Council of Europe over a number of years. 69 That, in turn, was inspired
by the U.S. experience of product liability. There was a deliberate attempt
not to go down the U.S. route. So there was a sense of differentiation. The
Council of Europe drafted a Convention on product liability whose

64. Sebastian Lohsse, The Development of Traffic Liability in Germany, in, supra note 30, at 81.
65. Miquel Martín-Casals & Josep Solé Feliu, The Development of Product Liability in Spain, in
PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 251-256.
66. Id. at 246-47.
67. Simon Whittaker, Introduction to Fault in Product Liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra
note 7, at 22.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 22-23.
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contents were discussed between 1971 and 1977.70 The process was
essentially technical, being discussed and agreed by a committee of
experts, and its adoption by Member States was entirely voluntary. Its
explicit concern was with the protection of consumers, understood to mean
any person physically injured or killed by a product. Its principal
provisions were clearly directly inspired by American law, most notably its
definition of “defect” in terms of “the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, having regard to all the circumstances.”71 This standard of liability
was seen as a “mixed system,” imposing neither an “absolute liability” nor
merely a presumption of fault.72 While the Convention never came into
force, its provisions were important as they formed the blueprint for the
European Economic Community (“EEC”) Commission in its proposals for
a directive governing liability for defective products to be enacted by the
Council. Both Italian and German chapters in the The Development of
Product Liability note how their national laws were changed by the 1985
Directive.73 The change in Italy was more marked than in Germany, since
the Germans had developed their own sophisticated case-law interpreting
§823 BGB in favour of consumers following the Fowlpest decision.74
D. Non-legislators
In relation to product liability, there was cross-national discussion by
the potential litigants and their insurers. This reflects the importance from
the nineteenth century of the growth in transnational interest groups.75
Perhaps the clearest examples come in relation to industrialization. Trade
associations existed in France, Italy and England. Their function was to
support their members by spreading good practice and conducting
inspections. Such industrial self-help was also supported by insurance
companies. They either conducted their own inspections or insisted on the
inspection. So the British Manchester Steam Users’ Association was
founded in 1854. French and Italian associations followed.76 There was
exchange between these associations. Regarding motor cars, there was an
early meeting in Paris of the International Association of Motoring in 1909
70. European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, Jan. 27,
1977, E.T.S. No. 91.
71. Id.at art. 2(c).
72. Whittaker, supra note 67, at 23 (citing Explanatory Report to the European Convention on
Product Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, E.T.S. No. 91, ¶ 17 (Jan. 27, 1977)).
73. See Wagner, supra note 50, at 133-38,218-22; see also Nadia Coggiola, supra note 37, at 21822.
74. See supra note 52.
75. MATTHEW HILTON, CONSUMERISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 301 (2003).
76. Martín-Casals & Ribot, supra note 62, at 60-61, 116, 207-08.
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which showed the extent of interchange at this early stage. In relation to
products, the Spanish chapter gives a graphic example:
[I]t was in the decade of the 1970s when public authorities and private
companies started to worry about the possibility of taking out liability
insurance for defective products (seguro de la responsabilidad civil
por productos). As a result of this concern, in October 1970, a seminar
dealing with tortious liability of companies, professional liability and
product liability was organised in Madrid under the auspices of Swiss
Re. According to Professor Rojo Fernández-Rio, the Spanish
experience in this area is parallel to the experience in other countries,
something that is shown by the fact that, in 1970, the European
Insurance Committee (CEA) also expressed, in its plenary assembly,
the concern of European insurance companies regarding coverage, as a
new risk, of product liability of producers. In Spain one of the first
scholarly studies on product liability insurance policies was published
in 1972, at a time when these policies were not yet sold in Spain.77

Insurance companies, too, engaged in sharing across jurisdictions. For
example, there was a lot of insurance undertaken in the United States by
European insurers as the U.S. economy developed.78
From these examples, we have seen that academics, legislators and
users of the law do not confine their attention to national boundaries.
Problems are not confined to those boundaries and are often neither texts
nor principles.
Academic study abroad is not a new phenomenon. The twentieth
century has made it more possible. In a number of areas, there is clear
evidence of the movement of ideas. It is clear that there has been extensive
reading of the legal materials of other countries. The area of product
liability, for example, demonstrates wide reading, particularly by
academics, of the developments in other countries.79 The development of
legal rules often reflects ideas that were prominent among jurists. Gorla’s
critique of Italian law on liability for products was then taken up by the

77. Martín-Casals & Feliu, supra note 65, at 264 (citations omitted).
78. Mathias Leimgruber, Accidental Crossings: Commercial Insurers and the Spread of
Workmen’s Compensation in Western Europe and the United States, 1880-1930 15-17 (Mar. 22, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
79. Coggiola, supra note 37, at 213-14 remarks on the way Gino Gorla in the 1950s examined
French solutions, as well as English and American solutions, even if he did not recommend their
wholesale adoption in Italy. The reversal of the burden of proof in Spanish car accident cases came in
1943, after there had been much pressure in the literature to create no-fault liability, influenced by
discussion of French, German and Italian laws. Miquel Martín-Casals & Albert Ruda, The Development
of Legal Doctrine on Fault in Spanish Tort Law, in LEGAL DOCTRINE, supra note 7, at 201.

BELL_PROOF2

2011]

3/25/2011 1:50:46 PM

THE RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN EXAMPLES

449

courts. More specifically, one can see reference to ideas of jurists being
used by judges to justify their decisions.80
Academics often play more than one role. Academics across all of the
jurisdictions often became law reformers, judges, and politicians. By way
of illustration, José Castán went from a professorship at Murcia to the
Supreme Court; Robert Badinter was a professor at Paris and, at the same
time, Minister of Justice, in which latter capacity he implemented proposals
for an automobile accident scheme. Percy Winfield and W.T. Stallybrass
were, respectively, professors in Cambridge and Oxford, who were
specially appointed to the Law Reform Committee. Such scholars, and
others like them, are not unusual. They do not just publish and hope that
they will be noticed, but have the means of making their voices heard.
Their later appointments put them in an excellent position to implement the
ideas they had developed in their academic careers.
III. STATUS OF FOREIGN LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A. Argumentative Status
Legal decisions do not typically depend on a single argument, but on
an accumulation of arguments.81 Even when faced with a binding statute or
precedent, the existence of other principles or rules may shape how that
single rule is interpreted. The model of legal reasoning I have in mind is
one that depends thus on a combination of reasons, each of which may be
insufficient to justify the decision in its own right, but, taken together, they
provide support for the decision.82 In other words, I would not look for a
single binding and thus exclusionary reason to justify a decision. Binding
reasons are not the only reasons. But it will be a matter of weighing the
combinations of reasons pulling in each direction. Within this model, there
is scope for a variety of reasons of different strength to contribute to a
justification. As a result, it is of limited value to look at individual reasons
such as foreign legal arguments on their own. The best analogy is with
threads making a rope. One thread is unlikely to hold up the weight. But
twisted in combination with other threads, it forms a cord which can carry a
substantial weight. Common lawyers are bewitched by the force of a single
binding precedent and often forget that precedents come in groups which
provide a context for each other. The meaning of a precedent is not just
80. See Mercier, Cass. Civ., 20 May 1936, D.P. 1936.1.88 at 94 (conclusions of Advocat Général
Matter quoting the academic writings of the reporter judge Josserand).
81. Cf. MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 192-93.
82. J. Wisdom, Gods, 45 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 185 (1944);
MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 213.
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given by the facts of the case, but also by the legal context out of which the
ruling comes. After all, the concept of distinguishing (which limits the
effect of a precedent) relies on the idea that any statement of the law also
contains a number of unexpressed ideas, which are then articulated in a
later case. The German expression ständige Rechtssprechung and the
French idea of la jurisprudence constante both contain the idea that, while
a single decision may not have a lot of force, a group of decisions in the
same direction have a gravitational effect.
To my mind, the most important combination is the way in which the
argument from a foreign legal system adds luster to an argument already
available in the host legal system. This is because I believe the mechanism
by which a foreign legal idea takes root in the host legal system is
essentially by means of the mechanism of “cross-fertilization.”83 Through
this form of influence, we obtain an indigenous reason for a decision that
integrates well within the host legal order. The foreign legal arguments
may shape the debate and cast some possible solutions in a better light. But
typically there is no wholesale direct transplanting of the solution from
another system, unless it also integrates with a local solution.
This is seen by the Italian and German cases, where the national
arguments remained preponderant. The illustrations in the second section
show that legal development is going to occur through a process of crossfertilization. That involves looking at what others do and coming to a way
of developing your own law which is both consistent internally and
coherent with the objectives that have been identified externally. The
foreign material adds luster to the national solution. But we start with the
national or code-based set of principles and then seek to apply them to the
problems we have before us. Foreign materials help us to explore solutions
that are out of the box. The problem that Gorla and Lorenz faced was that
their use of American or French material did meet the “threshold of fit” (to
use Dworkin’s term84) to satisfy the argument of internal consistency.
Rather than adopt a direct strict liability between manufacturer and
consumer, the courts adopted presumptions of fault. In broad terms it
achieved the same result, but was more consistent with the existing law.
Seen in this way, the foreign law reference adds strength to an existing
domestic law argument. The foreign law adds attractiveness because it
meets certain ideals of the domestic law. The Italian and German cases
both highlighted the importance of legal solutions integrating with

83. See generally Bell, supra note 17.
84. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986).
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domestic legal concepts but also with the ambitions of society to be
modern.
The attractiveness of the American solution was that it had the
authority of experience and modernity. It relies heavily on the idea of
reputation. Catherine Dupré has picked this up in relation to the use of
German constitutional court decisions in the development of Hungarian
constitutional law.85 For various reasons, which she explains, the German
court enjoyed a particularly high prestige in the eyes of Hungarian lawyers,
and therefore provided an important reference point when they were
developing their law.86 The importance of reputation for modernity and for
experience with the problems was important for the American case.
The reputation of a legal system depends on three factors. Prestige is
only one of them. There also needs to be a sense that the foreign system is
relevant. To go back to Dupré, Germany had managed to overcome the
problems of dictatorship and had developed a strong protection for human
rights. These were obviously relevant features for Hungary as it emerged
from communism. Similarly, the fact that the United States was in the
vanguard of the consumer economy and consumer society made it a
relevant reference point for Germany and Italy, as well as the European
Communities.
The third factor that determines reputation is the proximity of the
foreign legal system to the receiving system. Some legal systems are
naturally more proximate than others. Usually this is because they belong
to the same so-called legal family. Thus, Gorla turned first from Italian law
to French law, because it was part of the same legal family. Common
lawyers naturally look first to common law systems.
Basil Markesinis has argued that “[n]ecessity, practical commercial
necessity, is what will make the study of foreign law grow further and
deeper, not dreamers of the past nor trendy preachers of the present.”87 I
think Waldron shows that there is a deeper underlying reason. But whereas
Waldron thinks of the principles as a common enterprise, I think that may
go too far. There is a perceived common set of problems and the foreign
system shows how they may be resolved. But the result is the need for
thinking within a domestic system. We need the catalyst.

85. CATHERINE DUPRÉ, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS 167-71, 183-84
(2003).
86. Id. at 174-75.
87. BASIL MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND IN THE CLASSROOM 66
(2003) (emphasis added).
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B. How does the Foreign Law Argument Work?
In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.,88 Lord Bingham
argued:
[If] . . . a decision is given in this country which offends against one’s
basic sense of justice, and if consideration of international sources
suggests that a different and more acceptable decision would be given
in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this must
prompt anxious review of the decision in question. In a shrinking
world . . . there must be some virtue in uniformity of outcome
whatever the diversity of approach in reaching that outcome.

The function of the foreign legal example is to trigger internal enquiry
to find out why the host system appears to achieve a different result. In that
sense, its first function is methodological: to encourage more serious
thinking about one’s own system. Care needs to be given to the idea of
uniformity of outcome, particularly when it comes to deciding cases.
Judicial decisions rarely see the totality of a problem and it is often not
submitted to the judges in that form. As a result, it will be quite frequent
that a difference in outcome appears on that very specific point. But, as I
have said, the benchmark for evaluation is the outcome taken in the round.
The judge’s objective is to look at what others do and come to a way
of developing her own law that is both consistent internally and coherent
with the objectives that have been identified externally. The foreign
material adds luster to the national solution. But the judge starts with the
national or code-based set of principles and then seeks to apply them to the
problems before her. Foreign materials help us to explore solutions that are
out of the box from a domestic law point of view.
Any solution adopted gains luster from three features. First, the
foreign solution must fit with the problem as it presents itself in the host
system. To take an example, German law has specific problems with
liability for others, because under §831 of the German Civil Code, there is
only a presumption of fault that can be rebutted by showing that the
employer chose a competent employee or supervised him appropriately.89
This leads German lawyers to adopt solutions in contract to get around this
problem.90 The rules on vicarious liability are differently constructed in
French and English laws, so the legal problem does not present itself in the
same way.

88. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 32 (U.K.).
89. See MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 20, at 700.
90. Id. at 693-709.
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Second, to have weight, the foreign approach must be consistent with
internal legal principle in the host system. For example in the area of
product liability in the 1960s, American direct, strict liability of the
manufacturer was rejected in Italy and Germany, because it did not fit with
existing legal principles. A presumption of fault was adopted, because this
was more consistent with legal principle.
The third feature in creating luster to an argument is the reputation of
the system in question. As noted above, this breaks down into three
aspects: prestige, relevance, and proximity.91 Markesinis makes a
convincing argument that receptivity to foreign influences is a matter of
mentality among the judges.92 In particular, he suggests this may be partly
due to the education and experiences of individual judges,93 but also to a
general mood within the legal system.94 Catherine Dupré has picked this up
in relation to the use of German constitutional court decisions in the
development of Hungarian constitutional law. German constitutional law
had a reputation for having developed a robust system or protecting rights
after the experience of dictatorship, an outcome to which the Hungarians
aspired.95 The importance of reputation for modernity and for experience
with the problems was important for the influence of America on Italy and
Germany in relation to product liability. America was seen as the place
with experience of the modern problem of defective products and of having
identified it as a distinct social problem, rather than losing it within the
more general categories of sale or delict.
In addition, the reputation of a foreign system may depend on the way
it is presented in translation. Guido Alpa makes the point that, in the
nineteenth century, there were many translations of works on English law
by leading writers.96 But they did not lead to any influence from the
common law on Italian private law. The reason he suggests is that those
English authors who were translated generally criticised English law as
archaic and unsystematic. If national lawyers were not enthusiastic about
the merits of their own system, why should foreign lawyers take it
seriously?97 (This was in contrast to the enthusiasm expressed by many of

91. See discussion supra Part III.A.
92. See Basil Markesinis, Judicial Mentality: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a Factor Impeding
Recourse to Foreign Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1325 (2006).
93. Id. at 1356-59 (examining the German courts).
94. See generally MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 1 (considering not only U.S. Courts, but
also French ordinary courts).
95. DUPRÉ, supra note 85, at 99-101.
96. ALPA, supra note 15, at 376-77.
97. Id. at 380-81, 387.
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the same authors for the British constitution, and that enthusiasm was
influential.) This has an intimate connection with how the country is
perceived. Markesinis rightly stresses the accessibility of legal systems. It
is most noticeable that translations feature heavily in chains of connection.
To take a simple point, in product liability, the discussion of American law
by the German Bundesgerichtshof in the Fowlpest decision relies on the
work of Lorenz,98 the discussion of it by the Italian Corte di cassazione
almost certainly relies on Gorla,99 and that by the Advocate General
Tesauro in the European Court of Justice relies on an Italian author,
Ponzarelli .100 “Packaging” is a way in which Markesinis suggests material
needs to be given, and he is fundamentally right. Third, reputation depends
also on the receptivity of the receiving system. In both the Hungarian and
the product liability situations, a key vector in achieving this receptivity in
the receiving system was the presence of individuals who had studied or
visited the foreign country for an extended period of time. Prior familiarity
creates this form of willingness to consider a foreign system as having
something desirable to offer.
This discussion of the reputation and presentation of foreign sources
helps us to understand their place in the process of discovery. It helps us
see why national lawyers might think it useful to look at foreign sources
and how they might be able to access them. But it does not explain why
these foreign sources carry argumentative force. For this, we need to turn to
the more jurisprudential work of Waldron.
IV. THE JUSTIFICATORY FORCE OF FOREIGN CITATIONS
This article has suggested that foreign citations typically have
argumentative force because they encourage revised interpretations of
national sources. So the new argument is based directly on national sources
and only indirectly on foreign sources. But there are those who would wish
to give foreign citations a more direct authority. One such author is Jeremy
Waldron.
A. Common Enterprise: The Rule of Law
Waldron offers two arguments for treating foreign sources as
justifications for decisions in domestic courts. 101 The first is that the

98. See BGHZ, supra note 52, at 91, 93-96; MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 20, at 560.
99. See Martorano, supra note 42.
100. Case C-300/95, Comm’n v. U.K. 1997 E.C.R. I-2649 ¶ 16,n.4 (citing GIULIO PONZARELLI, LA
RESPONSABILITA CIVILE. PROFILI DI DIRITTO COMPARATO (1992)).
101. HIGHEST COURTS, supra note 4, at 103-07.
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foreign system provides an example of the methodology for resolving legal
problems. The second is that the argument of equal treatment applies, even
though the states involved in the comparison are not the same. I will add an
additional argument from human flourishing. But I will also argue that such
justifications for the force of foreign law citations as a distinct legal reason
are limited. They are limited because of the level of generality involved in
identifying common legal tasks across legal systems. In addition, any
comparative lawyer knows that you simply cannot compare legal rules or
legal outcomes without situating them in context. You need to see a
particular task that law performs in the light of other tasks that law
performs in a country and in relation to the tasks that other social
institutions perform. Put into that broader context, the comparability of a
foreign jurisdiction with the domestic jurisdiction may be more limited
than at first appears.
In the first argument, Waldron suggests that, even where domestic
courts are not applying a common set of binding rules with the foreign
system, that nation still has access to doctrinal and other solutions for
handling common problems. He rejects the idea that legal systems are just
trying to find the solution that fits the genius or culture of their own
society. They are looking to the best application of principles of justice in
their own setting. Because the domestic court is also looking to apply the
same principles, the solutions the foreign court adopted have a value as
methodological illustrations of how to conduct the exercise of finding the
right solution to a problem, as well as of how to justify a possible outcome.
Waldron lauds judges who check that their approach is the sensible way of
tackling a problem by learning from the method adopted by judges in other
jurisdictions.102 But the issue of showing that the outcome is right requires
a stronger argument: that the national rules are based on the same
fundamental principles.103
Waldron’s second argument on equal treatment has two distinct
alternatives. The first and most distinctive of the Waldron approach is to
examine what he calls “bottom-up demand for consistency.”104 In brief, this
means focusing on those in differing jurisdictions who are subject to
divergent treatment, but are otherwise in similar situations. He gives the
analogy of humanitarian agencies operating in a refugee camp. If a British
charity, Oxfam, operating in the north of the camp gives the refugees two
meals a day, and other agencies operating in the south give them only one

102. See id. at 102-04, 108 (citing example of Hopkinson v. Police).
103. Id. at 106.
104. Id. at 114.

BELL_PROOF2

456

3/25/2011 1:50:46 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:431

meal a day, different refugees in different parts of the camp get different
treatment. They will complain, but do they have any grounds of complaint?
They are aware of the different treatment of others and are (at least
humanly speaking) understandably distressed by the disparity of treatment.
He argues:
People in one country are aware of the way individual rights are
accorded to others, similarly situated in another country. They know
that their government is supposed to be responding to the same
principles, the same concerns, and the same circumstances as the other
governments, and so they wonder about fairness and why different
governments have not got their act together to ensure that, in this
world, like cases are treated alike.105

In other words, citizens complain that the same broad principles
should lead to the same results despite institutional or geographical
difference. The core of the argument is that the law is a search for a right
answer to the application of certain principles which has to be “figured
out.”106 In this he is arguing that, despite the institutional distinctiveness of
the nation states, they need to be seen together. There is something like a
common enterprise between legal systems. So, going back to the
illustrations in Part II, courts of all western countries could be seen to be
faced by similar problems in a consumer society, and so the results for
consumers in one country, such as Germany, should be similar to other
countries where the context is similar, such as the United States.
Waldron’s second argument is that the ius gentium (law of all nations)
acts as an intellectual clearing house of ideas. He argues:
It was a settled and embedded consensus derived from these principles
having become established in practice as actual legal arrangements all
over the known and civilized world. It was not natural law, though it
was informed by natural law. Though it was a cosmopolitan idea, it
was down-to-earth cosmopolitanism, ‘a brooding omnipresence on the
ground,’ if you like.107

Again he appeals to a kind of common enterprise. The decisions of
foreign courts are part of a common stock of potential solutions for
handling common problems and, domestic courts, in fairness to domestic
litigants, should refer to these. There is a common enterprise, such that we
105. Id. at 110.
106. See Jeremy Waldron, Partly Laws Common to All Mankind: Foreign Law in American Courts,
Part 3, Yale Law School Community Server (Sept. 12, 2007), http://cs.law.yale.edu/blogs/podcasts/
archive/2007/10/11/partly-laws-common-to-all-mankind-foreign-law-in-american-courts-part-3.aspx.
107. HIGHEST COURTS, supra note 4, at 114.
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should learn from those who are engaged in the same enterprise. This is
why he argues that, for the purposes of the protection of human rights, we
are all part of a single community.108 It is that basic assumption that
grounds the argument of global fairness. It is why there is a link between
the nature of law and the use of foreign law. Unlike Markesinis, I do not
think the argument is entirely utilitarian. Like Waldron, I think it has to be
principled because giving reasons for actions (legislation or judicial
decisions) is a principled activity.
In this article, I focus primarily on the argument that equal treatment
requires the consultation of foreign legal arguments and their use as part of
a legal justification. In order to develop the idea that foreign legal
arguments provide a justification within our own domestic law, one needs
to expand on Waldron’s argument, making it relevant to private law. I do
this in two stages. The first stage examines the nature of the “common legal
enterprise;” the second examines the actual practice of legal influence in
private law, recalling the earlier example from product liability.
In what way is law a “common legal enterprise” across a multiplicity
of countries? At a high level of abstraction, Hans Kelsen was right that
governance through law is a mark of social progress.109 That progress is
about the control of social power, power of individuals and power of the
State. Such an exercise of controlling power provides the elements of a
common agenda. That common agenda provides a basis for a dialogue
between legal systems, each seeking to learn from the other. This is true in
three ways. First, governance through law provides social order. Second,
the rule of law provides a control on the arbitrariness of the executive.
Third, the protection of fundamental rights provides a control over the
exercise of social power in the interests of the promotion of social wellbeing. These are three generic values that governance through law
achieves, but at this generic level, they provide common points of reference
for different legal systems. Such ideas reflect a broad conception of the rule
of law. It includes fundamental rights, encourages the independence of the
judiciary, and provides conditions for the exercise of rights. Lord Bingham
has suggested that this “thick theory” of the rule of law is to be preferred
these days.110 My colleague Trevor Allan argues that the rule of law has an

108. See id. at 109 (arguing that this is a demand of peoples, and not just rulers).
109. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1967) (1934).
110. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 67 (Allen Lane eds., 2010). See generally the Dehli
Statement of the International Commission of Jurists in NORMAN S. MARSH, THE RULE OF LAW IN A
FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS, NEW DEHLI, INDIA,
JANUARY 5-10, 1959 (Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, 1959).
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ethical imperative based on values common to all modern liberal
democracies.111 Applied to private law, such a thick conception of the rule
of law entails respect for rights. But, in the end, these are abstract and
general features of the ambitions of a legal system. It does not necessarily
mean that the specific areas that the law regulates, such as products, are
indeed necessarily common enterprises across legal systems. This has to be
shown in each case.
Going beyond Waldron, the other argument for seeing law as a
common enterprise focuses on the role of law in making possible the social
conditions for human flourishing. The conditions of welfare, as well as
economic and social rights that attach to this idea are contested. It is here
that the notion of the “social welfare state” (sozialer Rechtsstaat) has been
used.112 Although there may be disagreement about how this works out in
particular branches of the law, it is certainly a common ambition which
goes beyond classical areas of fundamental rights.
B. Common Principles
If law performs certain tasks that are common across the world, or at
least in developed countries, then it becomes natural that these countries
should look at how these tasks are performed elsewhere. This can be the
basis of the common principles to which Waldron alluded. Of course, there
is a significant level of generality involved in the description of the
common principles or tasks. Indeed, they might well be described as
categories of tasks, rather than specific tasks. There are lots of ways in
which to establish order in society, lots of ways in which to embody the
rule of law; lots of disagreement about what constitute fundamental rights
or human flourishing. But the international character of debates on these
matters can be seen in any work.113
Where there is a common function, the strength of an argument drawn
from a foreign law about the performance of that function is that it offers a
different perspective on that shared task. Waldron’s argument that people
can legitimately claim against their government that they are not being
treated equally to people in other countries in the performance of common
tasks has some force. But context imposes a significant limitation on its
force. It may be true that the victim of a traffic accident does not obtain
111. See generally TREVOR R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE
RULE OF LAW (2001).
112. Erich Fechner, Future Prospects of the Sozialer Rechtsstaat, in LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
SOCIETY 146 (Francis Charles Hutley, Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1979).
113. See e.g., Jean Rivero, Etat de droit, Etat du droit, in L’ETAT DE DROIT. MELANGES EN
L’HONNEUR DE GUY BRAIBANT 609-614 (Marceau Long & G. Vedel eds., 1996).
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compensation without proof of fault before the courts of one country, but
does in another. But is it unfair? If in the second system there is a strong
national health service provided by the state and a strong social welfare
system of benefits for those unable to work, then it is not clear that a
pedestrian who is unable to sue the car driver in tort without proving fault
has been badly treated, even if a pedestrian in another system is able to do
so. We can only form a serious judgment about inequality of treatment if
we take a holistic view of the victim’s situation. That requires us to look
not only at the law, but at other social mechanisms. The danger of
Waldron’s example of the refugee camp is that he concentrates on one
feature (meals per day) and does not draw our attention to the other features
of the situation. As I said at the beginning of this Part, it is a commonplace
of comparative law that you simply cannot compare legal rules or legal
outcomes without situating them in context. When we look at private law,
for example in relation to products, the law has compensation mechanisms
in contract and tort and also regulation through the criminal law.114 The
relationship between the three differs from system to system.115 In addition,
some systems have developed compensation mechanisms outside tort law
for particular causes of damage. If one is going to cite foreign law, then one
needs to be aware of the context in which the rules you are citing operate in
their foreign system, so that a genuine comparability can be established.
CONCLUSION
When a judge in one system cites a case from another system, he can
be claiming that this is evidence of a common principle of law or of the
right way to interpret an international instrument which is part of his
domestic law. But these will be the minority of situations when foreign
case law is cited. In most cases, the foreign judicial decision is being
offered as a way of gaining a perspective on arguments already available
within domestic law—the divergent ways in which the rules can be
legitimately formulated and interpreted. To the extent that the social and
political situation of the foreign jurisdiction are similar to that of the
domestic law, I would follow Waldron in thinking that it does add some
force to domestic arguments. The sense of fairness that similar situations
should receive similar solutions across legal systems has some weight, even
if the full force depends on a closer and holistic analysis of the way a
problem is treated by a legal system. Additionally, the foreign decision
provides a reflecting mirror to observe our own system and the options it

114. See Whittaker, supra note 67, at 3-11.
115. Id.
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has for development. It provides a counterfactual world in which
consequences can be tested, not merely hypothetically, but in some form of
grounded reality. But the argument of the paper has been that the force of
the eventual argument that is presented to justify a new judicial decision
remains firmly grounded in domestic law. If the reasons are not convincing
in domestic law, then no amount of foreign law is going to make them good
enough. Only where there is a sufficient body of individuals with authority
available in the host legal system can the luster added by foreign law do
any good. Foreign law is not a completely new argument, but provides
additional support to the arguments already available in the host domestic
legal system. To that extent, there is no difference between private law and
constitutional law. In constitutional law, one also has to find sources in the
domestic law which can then be enhanced or made more appealing by
reference to foreign law.

